Peace in the Gulf – Cheaper Fuel at the Pump? Not So Fast

Dr Edward Libbey

Almost nine months after the current conflict began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February, the Strait of Hormuz is neither open nor closed. Tehran says it could restore passage within two days if Washington accepts its terms. Washington calls those terms unacceptable. Oil flows through the Strait have recovered substantially, if erratically, from the lows of the second quarter. Yet attacks on tankers rose in October to their highest rate since the war began, and it is seafarers who continue to carry the risk. Diplomacy, as so often, moves at the pace of its slowest party.

The oil market has already moved. Brent fell 16% in the first week of November, its steepest weekly decline since the pandemic, and touched a ten-week low near $91.50 on 10 November. Dated Brent has slipped to a discount to futures, and JPMorgan estimates the world was oversupplied by some 1.4 million barrels per day in October. Prices reflect anticipation, not merely events: markets do not wait for the signing ceremony, but move on the first credible rumour of one.

The question I am now asked most often is how quickly prices will fall once a settlement is reached, and above all at the pump. My answer is that it depends entirely on which price you mean.

The Crude Barrel Will Move Fast

History is clear on this. On 17 January 1991, the first day of Desert Storm, oil rose briefly in Asian trading and then fell by roughly a third in a single session, the largest one-day collapse then on record. The price spike after the Abqaiq attack of 2019 had largely disappeared within a fortnight. Crude is a fungible commodity with a deep and liquid futures market, and its war premium is as much a financial construct as a physical one. It can be erased at the stroke of a pen.

This time the losses were far larger. At their peak this spring, supply losses exceeded 12 million b/d, nearly three times those of the 1973 embargo, yet the price response was much smaller than many predicted. The world simply does not depend upon oil as it did then. The release of strategic stocks softened the blow considerably, and high prices helped by suppressing demand.

Much of the logistical adaptation has also already happened. Gulf crude has found its way to market, albeit at considerable cost, and the market was essentially oversupplied before the first missile was fired. Remove the remaining risk premium and I would expect Brent to move back towards the $70s within weeks. I would not stake much on the precise number, but I would on the direction and the speed.

Refined Products Will Take Their Time

Products are another matter. The US diesel crack began the year below $30 a barrel, peaked above $110 in September, and still stood near $87 in early November. US distillate stocks fell at the end of October to their lowest level since 2003, and Mideast Gulf diesel exports in October dropped to around a third of September’s volume. Crude has adapted. The middle distillates, diesel and jet fuel among them, have not.

Three things will slow the recovery.

The first is damaged steel. Kpler estimates Middle East refinery runs at around 7.3 million b/d against 9.9 million in February. It expects a quick initial rebound as undamaged plants raise throughput once ships move freely, then a slower climb as damaged units are repaired, with more meaningful progress only from the first quarter of 2027. A hydrocracker cannot be restarted by treaty. Remember Hurricane Katrina: it was not a shortage of crude that sent petrol and heating oil prices soaring in 2005, but floodwater in Gulf Coast refineries. Experience also suggests that repairs take longer and cost more than first estimated. Rystad has already more than doubled its estimate of the Gulf repair bill, from $25 billion in March to $58 billion, and warns of a global equipment crunch.

The second is empty tanks. Distillate inventories must be rebuilt, and rebuilt in winter, when heating demand peaks. Restocking is itself a source of demand, and it will keep margins elevated long after the headlines have moved on. Rebuilding stocks also requires refiners to run flat out. In early October, the United States ruled out a proposed ban on diesel exports. Had one been imposed, American refiners would have lost those outlets and been forced to cut runs, tightening petrol supply and starving importers such as Europe of diesel.

The third is insurance, which has become a growing concern. Underwriters do not price hope; they price evidence, and they will want a ceasefire that is stable and verifiable before war-risk premiums come down. Those premiums have also weighed more heavily on smaller product tankers than on crude carriers, whose higher freight rates absorb the cost more easily. Peace will reach the supertanker before it reaches the clean tanker.

Behind all three sit structural problems that no Gulf settlement will touch. Russia was historically a major exporter of middle distillates to Europe, and the war in Ukraine does not look likely to end soon. European import restrictions, Russia’s own export bans and increasingly serious damage to its export refineries will not be reversed quickly. Europe, meanwhile, has spent two decades closing refineries, and the Atlantic Basin was short of middle distillates before this war began. A settlement will remove a shock. It will not repair these weaknesses.

What the Motorist Will See

Economists describe pump prices as rockets and feathers: they rise quickly and fall slowly, as retailers clear stock bought at higher prices and rebuild their margins. In the UK any fall is muted further by fuel duty, a fixed sum per litre that does not fall when crude does, so a sharp fall in crude becomes a more modest one at the forecourt. The Treasury, meanwhile, has been a quiet beneficiary: VAT is charged on the full pump price, duty included, so dearer fuel has meant higher receipts at a time when the Chancellor needs every pound. The motorist expecting the pump to mirror Brent will be disappointed.

A Two-Speed Peace

My expectation, then, is a two-speed peace: crude within weeks of a settlement, refined products over a much longer period, with jet fuel and diesel the last to normalise. I have not seen refining margins like this year’s in my lifetime, and I suspect diesel margins will remain well above pre-war levels into the second half of 2027, perhaps beyond. For refiners with complex conversion capacity, margins are likely to stay high long after the conflicts end. For freight, farming and aviation, the cost of this war will long outlast the war itself.

I remain, as you would expect, an optimist. Markets adapt faster than governments and considerably faster than forecasters. As I have written before, there is enough crude oil to meet the world’s demand for decades. But crude itself powers nothing. What the real economy needs is refined products and the means to move them, and restoring those is no quick fix. War can disrupt supply overnight; peace cannot restore it as quickly.

November 2026

Oliver Knox